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The EU as an international climate leader
For more than two decades, the EU has pursued international 
leadership on climate change. Ever since climate change ma-
tured on the international agenda in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the EU has demanded ambitious international action. Since then 
it has proven its ability to learn and adapt: In the early 2000s, it 
strengthened its internal coordination in order to overcome a ten-
dency of internal navel-gazing and reach out more effectively in 
dialogue with its international partners. Following the disappoint-
ing Copenhagen climate summit in 2009, it successfully reorient-
ed its international strategy towards coalition building, adapting 
to an evolving multipolar world of rising powers.1  As a result, it 
was able to realise important achievements, most recently the 
ground-breaking Paris Agreement adopted in late 2015, not least 
carried by a high-ambition coalition brokered by the EU and oth-
ers.
A focus on the EU’s international climate policy and leadership 
must not ignore domestic climate and energy policy – both go 
hand in hand. Lack of domestic climate policies crucially under-
mined the EU’s international credibility and unity in the 1990s. In 
turn, the EU becoming a frontrunner in implementing domestic 
climate policies and deploying key low-emission technologies 
such as renewables and energy efficiency was foundational for 
its international influence in the 2000s. As external and internal 
policies are inextricably linked, any thinking about the EU’s role in 
international climate policy also needs to look at domestic poli-
cies.2
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The challenge of the EU crises
The recent EU crises constitute serious and perhaps even per-
ilous challenges both for the EU’s domestic and international 
climate and energy policies. They tend to push climate and en-
ergy down the policy agendas across Europe and reduce the at-
tractiveness of the climate transformation as it implies further 
change easily considered unattractive in times of crisis. Brexit 
and the rise of populist parties, which lean toward combin-
ing Euro-scepticism with climate scepticism, weaken support 
for climate ambition within the EU. Especially support for the 
deployment of renewables has been axed in several member 
states in the wake of the intertwined economic and financial 
Despite an apparently ever-growing number 
of crises in Europe over the past decade, the 
fundamental rationale of the European Un-
ion (EU) and its member states actively and 
jointly exerting leadership in international cli-
mate and energy policy has not changed. The 
members of the Union remain bound together 
by common policies closely linked to the single 
market. They also have a common interest in 
fighting climate change and enhancing en-
ergy security and reaping the many economic 
opportunities of the ‘new climate economy’. 
And, with individual member states being vul-
nerable and lacking clout, they share a stra-
tegic interest in jointly shaping evolving inter-
national climate and energy governance. The 
crises therefore do not call for scaling down EU 
climate leadership ambitions, but for adjusting 
the leadership strategy.
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2crises (including the Euro crisis and the sovereign debt crisis), 
contributing to the EU falling behind in renewables investment 
in international comparison.3  
Overall, the crises have also strengthened calls for a reversion 
to the member states in European politics. In the European 
Studies literature, it has been argued that the dynamics of 
European integration have shifted towards member states for 
some time under the label “New Intergovernmentalism”.4  The 
past crises and the rise of Euro-sceptic parties in many mem-
ber states in particular have further empowered the narrative 
of ‘taking back control’, implying a stronger focus on the pow-
ers of member states as compared with ‘Brussels’, but also on 
the powers of regions and other sub-national entities, includ-
ing civil society.
The crises, furthermore, seem to give rise to and reinforce in-
ternal cleavages. The Eurocrisis has pitted southern member 
states against northern ones, while the migration crisis has re-
inforced structural internal East-West battle-lines and trench-
es that also characterize EU climate politics. This challenges 
EU unity at a more general level including in international cli-
mate policy – at a time when Brexit is poised to reduce the 
EU’s weight and capabilities in climate diplomacy and climate 
geopolitics. All in all, this would seem to undermine EU unity 
and hence effective international EU leadership on climate 
change.
The case for the continued international role and 
leadership of the EU
What may easily be overlooked in such a crisis account is that 
the rationale for EU climate (and energy) leadership remains 
strong and that some aspects of the trends/crises may even 
reinforce this rationale. First of all, EU member states remain 
bound together through existing climate and energy policies, 
which are currently being upgraded towards 2030. While some 
may attempt to weaken the framework, it is closely related to 
the single market the value of which has recently been high-
lighted by Brexit and may hence be unlikely to be challenged 
fundamentally. Furthermore, public support for coordinated EU 
action on climate and energy remains high.5  And with the ‘new 
climate economy’6  gaining pace worldwide, smart climate and 
energy policies continue to have an enormous potential to 
advance European economies and to ensure they can have a 
prominent and competitive place globally.
The Ukraine crisis is noteworthy because it has reinforced the 
place of energy security on policy agendas in Europe, with im-
portant potential for synergies with the climate agenda. One 
way of enhancing energy security is to increase energy effi-
ciency thereby lowering demand, and to invest in renewables. 
Accordingly, climate objectives form an integral part of the 
EU’s Energy Union project launched in early 2015 – not least in 
response to demands by Poland and other CEE member states 
after the eruption of the Ukraine crisis.7  This crisis has also 
served to bring home the external vulnerability of individual 
member states and hence the geopolitical rationale of Europe-
an integration and a strong Union towards the outside world.
The geopolitical rationale of joint EU leadership on climate 
change is also strong and growing in the wake of the Paris 
Agreement concluded in December 2015. In the evolving 
multipolar climate world, individual member states can hardly 
act on par with powerhouses such as China and the US. Brexit 
has raised awareness that a unified and strong EU possesses 
muscles in world politics – while individual member states do 
not. Climate change has been clearly established as an impor-
tant part of world politics. At the same time, the Paris Agree-
ment suggests that the game of climate geopolitics will be 
about ‘decarbonisation’: the drive to phase out the use of fos-
sil fuels will crucially shape future economic development and 
be an important aspect of the future world order.8  It remains 
therefore in the enlightened interest of EU member states to 
shape this process through leading domestically as well as 
internationally – pursuing this interest will significantly affect 
Europe’s prosperity and the place of Europe and European na-
tions in the world.
Key elements of a renewed leadership strategy
Against this backdrop, the central challenge for the EU in in-
ternational climate and energy policy consists in aligning two 
partially competing demands. On the one hand, a much-need-
ed strong role of the EU in international climate politics and cli-
mate geopolitics requires a strong and harmonised EU policy 
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framework and unity towards the outside world. On the other 
hand, current dynamics of European politics seem to ques-
tion deeper integration and unity and strengthen a narrative 
emphasising a strong role of individual member states. From 
a geopolitical perspective, I want to offer five elements of a 
strategy for how to square this circle and achieve continued 
and reinforced international climate leadership by the EU.
1) The EU needs a firm regulatory framework for climate and 
energy policy to 2030 and beyond. The elements of this 
regulatory framework are either already on the table (EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme, Effort-Sharing Regulation, also 
transport strategy) or to be proposed in 2016 (especially 
energy efficiency, renewable energies, energy markets, cli-
mate and energy governance framework). Such a common 
framework is indispensable for positioning the EU in the 
global race to the new climate economy and for EU unity 
and credibility in international climate politics. At the same 
time, the level of ambition of the measures is unlikely to put 
the EU economy on a clear path toward full decarbonisa-
tion and a phase out of net GHG emissions by 2050, as re-
quired by science and the Paris Agreement in order to hold 
global temperature increase below 2/1.5° Celsius from pre-
industrial levels.9
2) With political opposition from vested interests against both 
centralised EU regulation and decarbonisation remain-
ing strong, the importance of positive incentives to green 
or ‘climate-proof’ investments has already grown and is 
poised to grow further. This calls for paying particular at-
tention to a smart design of various funds (including the In-
novation and Modernisation Funds under the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme, the European Fund for Strategic Invest-
ments, the Cohesion Funds, etc.) and the broader policy 
and institutional framework for European investments (in-
cluding the EBRD, EIB, ECB, Eurozone monetary policy, but 
also energy market design, state aid rules, etc.). Shaping 
such positive incentives may have greater feasibility in the 
context of current European cooperation narratives, as it al-
lows a positive framing of the transformation and building 
in solidarity. As such, it possesses a significant prospect to 
help unleash support for the low-carbon transition.
3) Closely related, the rationale for leadership by individual 
member states is growing. As the scope for upward har-
monisation of EU climate and energy policies seems lim-
ited, there is good reason for member states to profile 
themselves as frontrunners. Indeed, creating an upward 
dynamic to achieve decarbonisation will, in line with the 
Paris Agreement, depend on such member-state leader-
ship. Legally, Article 193 TFEU allows member states to 
take more stringent protective environmental measures. 
EU regulation should thus, to the extent possible, be con-
ceived of and designed as minimum standards that permit 
and facilitate member states (and others – see below), 
possibly acting in regional groupings, to exceed them, in-
cluding through the use of positive incentives mentioned 
above. Such overachievement should not be simply, as is 
currently the case with the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 
‘consumed’ by other less ambitious member states. Also 
internationally, member states can go beyond common EU 
policy and thereby strengthen EU leadership, for example 
by notifying more ambitious national targets and measures 
under the Paris Agreement to complement the EU’s target. 
They can also further advance and intensify their engage-
ment in complementary frontrunner coalitions or partner-
ships that push ahead to advance and implement particular 
solutions.10
4) Similarly, the EU policy framework should facilitate and en-
courage leadership by sub-national and private actors such 
as cities, regions, business and civil society. Frequently 
transnationally connected and acknowledged under the 
Paris Agreement, such non-state initiatives form an increas-
ingly important driver of ‘polycentric climate governance’.11 
As in the case with frontrunner member states, domestic 
EU regulation should thus, to the extent possible, be con-
ceived of and designed as allowing, facilitating and incen-
tivizing (e.g. through the funds mentioned above) non-state 
actors to exceed them – without such overachievement 
simply being ‘consumed’ by the respective member states. 
Hence, policy frameworks should focus on establishing 
stable supportive conditions that create certainty for non-
state actors to enable and incentivise them to maximise 
climate protection. Compatible with the growing narrative 
of empowerment of lower levels of governance and own 
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initiative (‘taking back control’), such non-state action has 
significant potential to spur low-carbon development in Eu-
rope.
5) To remain influential in international climate governance, 
the EU needs to continue to engage in international coa-
lition-building. In a world of rising powers around the US 
and China as the two heaviest weights, smaller players like 
the EU and its member states need to form coalitions to 
enhance their weight. The EU has done so successfully 
post-Copenhagen and the rationale for a continued coa-
lition-building strategy grows further with Brexit. Acting 
through a bigger coalition may also provide an opportunity 
to link up to and coordinate with the UK after Brexit (in ad-
dition to the growing number of other countries engaging 
actively in the low-carbon transition). The EU and the UK 
could hence try to mitigate the effects of Brexit by pursuing 
coordination in the context of the ‘high-ambition coalition’ 
that formed in Paris. This high-ambition coalition may thus 
form a useful vehicle/mechanism for future EU-UK coordi-
nation of international climate policy.
These elements can form part of a strategy of international EU 
leadership on climate change that connects the international 
and intergovernmental with the domestic and transnational. 
The EU crises may have dented the appetite for change in Eu-
rope. It is important to understand, however, that change is 
inescapable: the impacts of climate change will increasingly 
force European societies to adapt – by advancing the climate 
transformation we can shape the societal change, while limit-
ing the change that climate change impacts will force upon us. 
The aforementioned elements may hold the promise to shape 
and advance the change through encouraging action on na-
tional and subnational levels on the basis of as strong EU-level 
action as possible.
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